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TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF COLLUSIVE INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS: 
DARK AND SHADOW NETWORKS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the 
theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. ‘Successful’ collusive 
industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal 
managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend 
and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on 
evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated 
chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of ‘shadow networks’ 
(networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of 
network structure dominate akin to ‘normal’ managerial endeavours such as joint 
ventures) and ‘dark networks’ (networks which appear more opaque and secretive 
through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to 
illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to 
build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm 
interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing 
practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing 
function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of 
antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm 
networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust 
agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing 
literature. 
 
 
Key words: Collusive Networks; Network Structure; Cartels; Dark Networks; Shadow 
Networks. 
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TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF COLLUSIVE INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS: 
DARK AND SHADOW NETWORKS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and Samsung Semiconductor Inc (US) agrees to plead 
guilty and pay fines of $300 million by US Department of Justice (DoJ), for an 
international price-fixing conspiracy in the dynamic random access memory market 
(DRAM) in 2005. 
 
In 2004, German memory chip maker Infineon Technologies is fined $160 million by 
US DoJ for breaching US antitrust law by secretly engaging in price-fixing in its 
DRAM chip market through colluding with other manufacturers in the industry. 
 
 
B2B price-fixing cartel networks have been documented to operate across diverse markets, 
effecting inter-firm relationships and interaction in a broad range of industries (Conner, 2008; 
Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). Past regulatory investigations have documented illegal price-
fixing cartels in metals, vitamins, chemicals, air transportation, textiles, graphite electrodes (used 
in the manufacture of steel), synthetic rubber and semiconductor industries, among others. Since 
1990 there have been approximately 495 formal investigations of suspected cartels by antitrust 
agencies around the world, implicating some of the largest industrial corporations (Connor, 
2008). At least 373 individual and named executives were penalised – hundreds more were 
found guilty but received immunity, while thousands more were found guilty but not prosecuted. 
Cartels have been thought to have affected sales globally by $16.6 trillion. 
Previously, B2B marketing research has predominantly focused on vertical relationships 
between supplier and customer (e.g. Ford et al. 2003), while horizontal relationships between 
competitors have received considerably less research attention. Nevertheless, collaborative 
endeavours between competitors such as joint ventures, alliances, shared technology and R&D 
investment, and joint distribution and marketing efforts (such as cobranding), have considerable 
lineage as research topics. In addition, the phenomenon of co-opetitition (simultaneous co-
operation and competition between firms) has received increasing research attention 
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(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Luo, 2004; Walley, 2007; 
Rusko, 2011; Ritala, 2011). The significance of collusive horizontal business relationships, such 
as illicit price-fixing in B2B networks, however, has been largely overlooked by marketing 
scholarship. This is somewhat surprising owing to the demonstrable economic significance and 
prevalence of collusion (Conner, 2008), and its relevance to understanding all forms of 
relationships between firms, not just legitimate ones. 
This understanding, it seems, has not just theoretical relevance to industrial marketing but 
also practical importance, particularly as “...antitrust decisions can affect future marketing 
practices and alternative strategies” (Shocker, 2007: 95). As a consequence, there is a need to 
gain a greater comprehension of all forms of criminal behaviour that marketing personnel may be 
party to in order to help educate practitioners. If marketing scholars fail to engage with issues of 
antitrust and horizontal collusion in a substantive manner “...which arguably it does not at 
present” then we can speculate “that we have not heard the last of collusive interfirm 
relationships” (Tadajewski, 2010). This could be costly to our disciplinary standing and 
understanding of all aspects of industrial marketing phenomena. We can identify strong 
theoretical linkages between collusive B2B practices and B2B marketing. For one, we maintain 
that ‘successful’ collusive B2B practices, such as cartels, tend to require long-term collaboration 
and trust between competitors. This combination of relationship longevity and mutual trust has 
been a central theme in industrial marketing research (e.g. Håkansson, 1982; Axelsson and 
Easton, 1992; Ford et al. 2003). Second, activities concerning pricing have been traditionally 
recognized as a core component of the marketing mix (Borden, 1964), and we will highlight the 
role of marketing managers in price-fixing in our findings and discussion sections. Third, price-
fixing cartels are a collusive attempt to influence (and undermine) vertical buyer-seller 
relationships and the nature of exchange between cartel members and their customers. Price-
fixing cartels hence seek to systematically shape the characteristics of industrial networks, which 
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is another central area of interest in industrial marketing research (e.g. Axelsson and Easton, 
1992; Ford et al. 2003). Overall, this indicates that collusive B2B practices, such as the price-
fixing cartels, have a considerable theoretical overlap with the research domain of B2B 
marketing. 
Yet industrial marketing research has made only tentative steps in addressing the ‘dark’ (or 
illicit) side of marketing management. This lack of realism can be seen as an inherent bias in our 
contemporary knowledge of industrial marketing. To provide an accurate description of our 
subject matter, we need to recognize the more problematic social realities faced by real-life 
marketing managers and their organizations, even if this concerns prevailing social taboos and 
even criminality. Failure to address these issues would not be “…an accurate memory of our 
discipline” (Keen, 1992). This implies a need for an open-minded exploration and analysis of the 
‘dark side’ of real life marketing practices (Tonks, 2002). In addition, there are powerful 
methodological reasons for the lack price-fixing studies in B2B marketing research; as most 
contemporary B2B cartels are illegal conspiracies, it can be exceedingly difficult for researchers 
to obtain information about cartels, as is frequently the case with instances of corporate 
misconduct (Vaughan, 2011), where information given to researchers may incriminate managers 
and companies in question. Also, such elusive, illegal, and secretive conduct renders B2B cartels 
largely invisible to most company employees, customers, and regulatory authorities (and also 
researchers). Consequently, standard industrial marketing research methods (such as surveys and 
interviews) are by-and-large ineffective in investigating price fixing cartels. More importantly, 
while the study of vertical relationships is well established in the literature (see, for example, 
Håkansson, 1982; Håkansson, and Ford, 2002; Ford et al. 2003), based on the research in the 
present study examining secretive horizontal relationships, however, these same theories and 
explanations do not hold and lack theoretical adequacy in explaining such phenomena. Similarly, 
the co-opetition literature has overlooked many crucial questions related to our theoretical 
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understanding of horizontal relationships, including how relationships between competitors are 
maintained, where they exist at different points in the supply chain and the various types of co-
opetition – whether these are legal or illegal modes of co-opetition. 
In this paper, we can thus explain how such horizontal relationships collude in terms of 
their structure and related mechanisms of control (which expands on previous attempts to do so 
by industrial economists, corporate criminologists, and sociologists – such as Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2006; Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Geis, 1967), and why B2B cartels have eluded 
industrial marketing researchers, despite what must amount to many millions of hours 
researchers collectively spend in the investigation of B2B marketing. In sum, we wish to expand 
upon and contribute to our current theoretical understanding of not just horizontal relationships 
conducted in a spirit of co-opetition, but also the illegal and secretive ones as well; thus also 
affording us the opportunity to forward theory for subsequent testing. 
The broad aim of this paper therefore is to establishing B2B cartels as a new line of inquiry 
in industrial marketing management research. We seek to accomplish this by using key tenets of 
industrial marketing theory to illuminate our investigation of cartel collusion. More specifically 
our research objective is to uncover and contrast different types of horizontal collusion between 
competing firms. In addition, we seek to provide a rich qualitative description of how some types 
of cartels may be more effective in the protection of B2B cartel conspiracies. By doing so we 
introduce the concepts of ‘dark’ and ‘shadow’ networks – a form of analogical comparison 
employed to illustrate two broad types of structuring in horizontal price-fixing networks, and a 
useful device that promotes theory building (cf. Vaughan, 2011). This contribution helps 
facilitate our broader understanding of industrial relationships and networks. 
The paper is structured the following way. We first consider the literature related to co-
opetition, as such studies attempt to explain horizontal relationships between competitors. Next, 
we examine the literature related to collusion in industrial markets. After this we outline the 
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methodology underpinning our investigation of industrial cartels. The remainder of the study 
examines the practices and structure of the four industrial cartels studied. We conclude by 
providing implications for marketing theory and practice. 
 
Literature Review 
Co-opetition in business networks 
There is a considerable amount of research describing collaborative endeavours between 
competitors such as joint distribution and marketing efforts (such as cobranding), joint ventures, 
alliances, and shared technology and R&D investment. The concept of co-opetition, however, 
was introduced to highlight the simultaneous co-operation and competition between firms 
popularised by Raymond Noorda (see Luo, 2007) and Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) – 
where mutually dependent inter-firm relationships are preferred between competitors in some 
supply chain activities, while competition is favoured in others – and is a response to the blurring 
of traditional roles between competitors (Hamel et al. 1989; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1992). Hence 
the co-opetition concept recognises the concurrent ‘co-operate-compete’ relationship inherent 
between the traditional paradigms of competition and co-operation (Padula and Dagnino, 2007). 
The nascent literature on co-opetition has attracted studies on several topics including: 
 
i. ‘Why’ co-opetition: Attempts to expand markets through joint value creation 
initiatives such as new product development, new market entry, or technology 
transfer (Luo, 2004; Walley, 2007; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996); 
ii. ‘Where’ co-opetition: Competitors co-operate predominantly in upstream activities at 
a distance to the customer (input activities such as product development) while 
competing in downstream activities (output activities such as distribution) (Walley, 
2007; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000), although co-operation and competition may occur 
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in upstream, midstream, and downstream activities in the supply chain (Rusko, 2011); 
and 
iii. ‘What’ co-opetition: Or, what factors (external forces) influence co-opetition within 
an industry. For example, Rusko (2011) found that the ‘centre of gravity’ in co-
opetition – the decision to co-operate or compete, can be motivated by industry 
traditions, regulators and government interventions, and market forces. 
 
Although a valuable concept in helping to explain the rationale for many forms of horizontal 
industrial relationships (cf. Bengtsson and Kock, 2000), the foregoing concept of co-opetition 
has some noticeable shortcomings. Firstly, one aspect that has received limited attention is the 
‘how’ of co-opetition, or, put another way, how are horizontal relationships between traditional 
competitors maintained within a framework of co-opetition? The majority of the industrial 
marketing literature has focused on vertical relationships (or classic ‘buyer-supplier’ dyad), 
which are relatively visible and dispersed along the supply chain depending on competencies and 
resources. In contrast, horizontal relationships are often different to vertical relationships in 
many ways (such as visibility and formality) and can take many forms (Bengtsson and Kock, 
2000), spanning legal forms, such as alliances for joint product development, to illegal forms, 
such as collusive practices to fix prices. 
A second limitation of the co-opetition concept relates to the ‘where’ of co-opetition, in that 
downstream forms of co-opetition (i.e. co-operation close to the customer) have received limited 
attention (cf. Rusko, 2011; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). This is a weakness in the current 
thinking on co-opetition in that it occurs chiefly in upstream activities, while competition occurs 
mainly in downstream activities (cf. Walley, 2007; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). Indeed, rival 
firms may choose to co-operate at any point in upstream (input) or downstream (output) supply 
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chain activities, from raw material acquisition to cobranding and distribution initiatives (Rusko, 
2011), rather than simply ‘at a distance from the customer.’ 
A third omission (and linked to the previous point) is the coverage of ‘types’ of co-
operation, or, the nature of co-operative endeavours between competitors. Some forms of 
horizontal relationships (typically upstream activities) are well understood – such as inter-firm 
alliances (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Cauley de la Sierra, 1995; 
Yoshino and Rangan, 1995; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1992), as well as alliances within the context 
of co-opetition (e.g. Rusko, 2011; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000) – yet others, including 
downstream (or output) activities, are little understood. 
A fourth and final criticism of co-opetition is related to ‘visibility’. Under the precepts of co-
opetition theory, “if both the elements of cooperation and competition are visible, the 
relationship between the competitors is named coopetition” (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; 1996). 
Other than for reasons of legality (cf. Rusko, 2011) the underlying logic for visibility as a 
prerequisite for co-opetition is unclear. The rationale for visibility would seem tenuous (to whom 
and of what?). In some cases visibility would seem of little importance (such as co-operative raw 
material purchasing agreements), while in other instances concealment of activities would seem 
important. Rival organizations co-operating on the development of new products or joint 
technology initiatives would probably wish to keep such endeavours as secret as possible; while 
competitors engaged in price-fixing activities would likewise wish to keep such practices covert. 
Both practices, however, could well occur within the context of co-opetition: the simultaneous 
act of co-operation and competition. 
Indeed, on the latter point, one form of downstream co-operation – price-fixing agreements 
– are seen to fall outside of the conventional co-opetition framework on the dual criteria that they 
do not lead to mutual benefit for both producer and customer (Walley, 2007), and as they are 
regarded as chiefly a downstream activity (Rusko, 2011). Hence the current somewhat narrow 
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definition of co-opetition excludes collusive relationships as part of the co-opetition framework 
(as a downstream activity), but also negates the fact that firms in collusive relationships who fix 
prices (co-operate) often simultaneously compete in other areas such as brand strength or quality 
(Rusko, 2011). Further, price-fixing activities are not exclusively downstream activities, they can 
occur at any point in the supply chain, and not just between a supplier and final customer. 
A somewhat obvious (but neglected) point is the platform (and temptation) that co-opetition 
affords particularly dominant firms’ to engage in collusive practices such as price-fixing cartels 
(Sharma, 2002). For example, in times of economic adversity the temptation for executives to 
extend legitimate collaborative relationships “to embrace a short-term fix to raise prices and 
allocate markets is almost irresistible” (Klawiter, 2008: 2). Under these circumstances co-
opetition can become collusion – a practice that would seem more common than was previously 
thought (Connor 2008; The Economist 2008; WTO 1997). 
To reject an understanding of certain types of co-opetition (such as collusive relationships) 
would also seem to risk an incomplete understanding of co-opetition and horizontal industrial 
relationships. In this study we undertake an exploratory investigation of this type of co-opetition 
by examining collusive horizontal relationships between competitors. In the following section we 
consider related theories of collusive practices in industrial markets. 
 
Theories of collusive practices in industrial markets 
Many forms of horizontal relationships are well understood in the industrial marketing literature 
(such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, and joint distribution and marketing activities) (cf. 
Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). Less well understood are illegal horizontal relationships such as 
bid-rigging agreements, or price-fixing cartels. In this study we focus on price-fixing cartels – a 
practice that refers to agreements between two or more independent firms who collude to control 
the terms of business in a particular market (Dick, 1996). Despite the theoretical connectedness 
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of B2B cartels and industrial marketing management, collusive practices such as price-fixing 
networks between organizations have received limited attention by industrial marketers. This can 
be contrasted with the fields of organizational criminology and industrial economics where some 
studies of industrial collusion and price-fixing cartels have been undertaken. These contributions 
are now briefly summarized. 
Worthy of special mention are two studies of price-fixing cartels. The first is a meta-study 
by industrial economists Levenstein and Suslow (2006). Based on twenty-one data sets of cross-
sectional studies of cartels spanning 1880-1997, they found that (i.) the more members in a 
cartel, the shorter its duration, (ii.) successful cartels create mechanisms to share information, 
decision-making, and incentives “through self-imposed carrots and sticks” (Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2006: 86), (iii.) concentration aids cartel stability (i.e. ‘successful’ cartels are conceived 
and maintained by a small number of dominant actors), and (iv.) cartel co-ordination among 
multiple actors is inherently complex. In the second study, sociologists Baker and Faulkner 
(1993) draw on a typology of two types of communication networks: centralized and 
decentralized. By definition, in centralized cartel networks a single actor (or a small number of 
actors) acts as a ‘hub’ in a hierarchical fashion. Decentralized cartel networks in contrast are 
defined as networks where no central actor dominates and all actors may be more or less all 
linked. Based on an examination of illegal networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment (HEE) 
industry in the US in the 1950s, the authors conclude that due to a need for concealment actors 
will form networks that are centralized and led by a small number of actors in a hierarchical 
manner. Based on these contributions it has been argued that successful and stable cartels 
involve a small number of firms seeking to create mechanisms to control the cartel and its 
information processing, organized in a hierarchical and highly centralized fashion. 
In their analysis of the HEE industry, Baker and Faulkner (1993: 849) illustrate five 
different types of cartel network structures. As mentioned above, the key distinction in their 
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analysis is the difference between centralized and decentralized networks. In a centralized 
network one network member has a more prominent role than others in connecting network 
members together, hence becoming the central network member. What this taxonomy does not 
explain, however, is how cartels actually function. For example, even if we are cognisant of the 
linkages between cartel members, this does not explain how information is shared between cartel 
members. For example, do all cartel members share the same information, or are there material 
differences in cartel members’ knowledge regarding the nature of a criminal conspiracy? Also, 
this taxonomy does not explain when information is shared. For example, in Baker and 
Faulkner’s (1993) study of cartel structures, one cannot distinguish the difference between (i.) 
joint cartel meetings where all cartel members simultaneously meet to plan and manage cartel 
activities, and (ii.) loosely connected cartel networks where different cartel members might make 
occasional phone calls to each other or else meet in small groups or dyads on a periodic basis. In 
the taxonomy used by Baker and Faulkner (1993: 849) both of these network structures would be 
labelled as “complete decentralized communication structures” despite their fundamentally 
different communication principles and modus operandi. In the present study, however, these 
significant operational differences are penetrated in considerable detail. 
In addition, industrial economists assert that cartels are more likely to be formed in 
industries with few sellers (often by ten or fewer firms), and in those with intermediate or high 
industry concentration (most sales are accounted for by a small number of sellers), due to the 
“low costs of planning and enforcing a conspiracy and the smaller likelihood of being caught” 
(Hay and Kelley, 1974: 24). Co-ordination is thought to increase exponentially as the number of 
conspirators increases owing to greater communication flows between participants (Scherer, 
1980). Hence large numbers of firms with low industry concentration are considered as “natural 
barriers to coordination” (Hay and Kelley, 1974: 25). 
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Although collusive practices such as price-fixing have been extensively studied by 
industrial economists “the internal social organization of conspiracies is treated as a ‘black box’” 
(Baker and Faulkner, 1993: 841). Scherer (1980: 225) elaborates further, concluding that “the 
relationship between an industry’s informal and formal social structure and its ability to 
coordinate pricing behaviour … lies beyond the reach of conventional economic analysis.” In 
support, Hay and Kelley (1974: 25) note that the social structure of price-fixing cartels “cannot 
be quantified.” Studies that do not confirm to these ‘principles’ of cartel formation (for example, 
Sonnenfeld and Lawrence, 1978; Posner, 1970) have been categorized as “puzzling anomalies” 
by industrial economists and have compelled them “to make assumptions that oversimplify the 
social organization of price-fixing conspiracies” (Baker and Faulkner, 1993: 842). 
The organizational crime literature recognises that such crimes are committed by 
individuals for the benefit of the organization rather than the individual (although they may hope 
to benefit through pay rises, promotion and so on), whether in the form of bribery, pollution, 
antitrust violations, or other criminal activities (Shapiro, 1976: 14). Both organizational 
criminologists and industrial economists have attempted to understand the illegal practices of 
firms through macro-level forces (such as industry structure, state of the economy, business 
cycle), where declining firm performance and market share have (rather unsurprisingly) been 
observed as common catalysts for corporate wrongdoings (Shapiro, 1980; Clinard and Yeager, 
1980; Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975). Organizational criminologists accept that social structures 
and mechanisms support antitrust practices (Simpson, 1986), but also oversimplifies the social 
organization of collusion, where small numbers of actors working closely together are regarded 
as the archetype of collusion (see, for example, Siegel, 1989; Malz and Pollack, 1980). 
Participants in collusive networks seek to maximize their concealment to form ‘secret societies’ 
(Simmel, 1950) by limiting face-to-face meetings and channels of communication or the 
introduction of ‘buffers’ (Goffman, 1970) between senior and middle and lower level managers. 
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In summary, Shapiro (1980: 29) maintains that “the study of crime and deviant behaviour 
has been negligent … in its lack of attention to the form and social organization of criminal 
activity. We know a great deal about criminals … but very little about the activity itself.” In the 
intervening period, little research appears to have been undertaken to assuage Shapiro’s (1980) 
criticisms. Indeed, Clinard and Yeager (2006: 279) note that “The complex structural 
relationships in large corporations make it difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle delegated 
authority, managerial discretion, and ultimate responsibility.” 
Though not without their merit, our understanding of collusive industrial practices and their 
structure would appear to be limited to a handful of cross-sectional positivistic studies of cartels 
operating in the 1990s and earlier. Against the foregoing we can raise a number of pertinent 
research questions. Initially, how are horizontal collusive relationships between competitors 
structured and maintained by marketing managers? What mechanisms or structures are used to 
more effectively monitor and controls cartel activities? And how do marketing managers achieve 
greater levels of cartel secrecy and reducing the risk of a cartel being detected? 
The remainder of the study evaluates these questions and critically examines the 
assumptions of the foregoing studies. This is illustrated by drawing on four major contemporary 
industrial cartels operating in diverse industries. 
 
Research Method and Data Collection 
Background and context: archival analysis 
The secretive and illicit nature of B2B price-fixing cartels provides a considerable challenge to 
empirical academic research. It is often difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to obtain 
reliable information from firms regarding their illegal cartel activities. Common research 
methods, such as questionnaires, interviews, and ethnographic observations are potentially 
unreliable sources of information in cartel research, and generally unobtainable. To overcome 
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these difficulties, we employed archival research methods; a rare but not uncommon method 
deployed in industrial marketing studies (Gupta et al. 2010), and one that has been employed to 
considerable effect in the field of management studies1. 
The archival assessment builds on previous analyses of antitrust cases (such as price-
fixing) in the UK and US. Much of the UK literature considering these types of cases (e.g. Weir 
1992, 1993; Davies et al. 1999) has questioned why certain judgements have been made through 
comparison of final report outcomes. Many of the US studies assessing competition judgements 
from the Department of Justice have extended this analysis and quantify the frequency of salient 
characteristics of antitrust cases over time (e.g. Connor 2004; Ghosal and Gallo 2001; Gallo et 
al. 2000; Lin et al. 2000; Wood and Anderson 1993; Posner 1970). Although few in number, 
other archival assessments of illegal corporate behaviour have developed in the marketing 
literature, considering individual cases (Ashton and Pressey 2004), cases over a time period 
(Ashton and Pressey 2008), case studies (Bush and Gelb 2005; Tadajewski 2010), and the remit 
of competition law to practices such as relationship marketing (Fontenot and Hyman 2004). 
This study draws on these approaches to case analysis and undertakes an assessment of 
competition reports published by the European Union concerning price-fixing cartels. Our 
evidence consisted of the detailed reports and documentation provided by the European Union’s 
investigations of the firms participating in the cartels examined. This approach afforded 
triangulation through the numerous data sources drawn on and reduces the possible bias inherent 
in personal accounts. The EU competition reports constitute a rich source of data as (possibly 
given the legal ramifications of its judgements) it endeavours to undertake thorough 
investigations (each taking an average of three to five years to complete) of corporate 
wrongdoings on a Pan-European basis. Hence the data (which are employed in this study) is 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Diane Vaughan’s (1996a, b, 1990) impressive study of the Challenger spaceship tragedy in 
1986, and Karl Weick’s (1993) examination of the Mann Gulch fire which claimed the lives of thirteen men in 
1949. 
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triangulated through multiple sources of evidence, via: (i.) interviews with executives involved in 
the price-fixing agreements, (ii.) documentation related to price-fixing meetings (such as 
agendas, internal notes and reports), and (iii.) interviews and input from diverse stakeholder 
groups including suppliers, customers, competitors, consumer groups, and the general public. 
Hence the findings of the investigations are afforded a high degree of validity and reliability. 
The European Union also serves as a useful context in which to examine collusive 
practices such as price-fixing. In addition to being a major and attractive market to investors, its 
antitrust authority and competition systems have become increasingly stringent. Indeed “… for 
large enterprises ‘antitrust risk’ – the risk of violating some competition law provision – is 
substantially higher in the European Union than anywhere else” (Hylton and Deng, 2007: 314-
315). In addition, the European Union is regarded as the biggest antitrust prosecutor and has 
been viewed as such for over a decade (Connor, 2008). 
 
Inductive Research Design 
An inductive case study design was employed. According to Pierce, “...[while] deduction 
proves something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative...” (reported 
in Hanson, 1958: 85). An iterative approach of ‘theory-data-theory’ was adopted following 
Bonoma’s guidance to inductive case research (1985: 204-206), the purpose of which 
Bonoma notes is “…not quantification or even enumeration [but] in a word, the goal is 
understanding” (206) – a technique ideally suited to the present study. In practice, the 
inductive case study analysis followed the detailed cyclical method of ‘Systematic 
Combining’ outlined by Dubois and Gadde (2002); a ‘back and forth’ process of data 
analysis, questioning findings, and data analysis, in order to produce the key research 
findings presented in the study. During this ‘back and forth’ process of data analysis, we tried 
to remain inductively open to new lines of enquiry, despite our past knowledge of cartels 
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literature, chiefly in the areas of industrial economics and organizational criminology. 
As a starting point of our enquiry, our sample of cases was drawn from cartel 
investigations issued by the EU for the period 1990-2010 (n=433), of which there comprised 94 
collusive networks in total (comprising 22% of all antitrust cases). These cases are investigated 
following a reference under Articles 81 and 82 of EU competition law2. Preliminary analysis of 
these cartels allowed us to identify key linkages between industrial marketing management 
theories and how illicit cartels are managed. In addition, this broad exposure to different types of 
cartels sensitized us key questions regarding cartel management. 
At this point of our investigation, we uncovered the significance of bilateral and 
multilateral cartel structures (explained in more detail below), which became a central theme in 
the subsequent investigation. To allow for more in-depth investigation of multilateral and 
bilateral B2B cartels a theoretical sample (cf. Yin, 2003) of four major price-fixing cartel cases 
were chosen (Vitamins, Butadiene Rubber, Choline Chloride and Flat Glass). As a theoretical 
sample, our selected cases were not intended to be statistically representative of all cartels. 
Accordingly, our research objective is to make theoretical generalizations rather than statistical 
generalizations (ibid). In addition, the final sample of case studies chosen was well-suited to 
illustrate the exploratory purposes of this study and the two ‘types’ of cartel organization 
uncovered, as Siggelkow (2007: 21-22) observes: “[An additional] valuable use of cases in the 
context of making a conceptual contribution is to employ them as illustration.” The four cases 
were also selected based on the illustrative powers of each and what might be learnt from them 
individually (more detail in this regard is provided in the discussion section): 
i. Flat Glass: This case demonstrates how the managerial structure of multilateral cartels 
that allows cartels to operate effectively, can also undermine cartels long-term 
                                                          
2 Article 81 prohibits agreements between two or more firms which restrict competition, while Article 82 
ensures dominant firms do not abuse their position. Articles 81 and 82 are effectively the European legal 
equivalent of the US Sherman Act. 
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survival. This includes the way successful multi-lateral price-coordination resulted in 
suspicious price patterns, resulting in the cartel being detected by authorities. In 
addition, managerial culture of the cartel relied upon on bureaucratic practices and 
related managerial artefacts which were later used as evidence against the cartel 
participants; 
ii. Choline Chloride: This case depicts how a ‘boardroom style’ multilateral structure was 
used to enforce cartel discipline and to mitigate against ill-feeling and mistrust 
between cartel participants; 
iii. Butadiene Rubber: This case provides an example of a cartel that operated purely along 
bilateral and highly secretive lines from its inception, which made the cartel more 
difficult to detect and unravel by authorities. Yet, from the managerial perspective, 
this emphasis on secrecy facilitated the managerial efficiency and clandestine nature 
of the cartel; and 
iv. Vitamins: This case illustrates both multilateral and bilateral forms of cartel structure 
which operated along the life span of a collusive network. The documented events 
demonstrate how a switch from multilateral to bilateral structure can be used to aid 
cartel secrecy. 
 
The chosen theoretical sample also produced further relevant insights – the witnessing of 
marketing managers occupying central roles in cartel formation and maintenance, thereby 
strengthening the significance of these cartels to the field of industrial marketing management. 
Further, all four cartels selected on the basis of theoretical sampling (these cartels and their 
salient characteristics are presented and discussed in subsequent sections) were undertaken by 
major organizations in significant markets, involving both firms from the European Union and 
also outside of its borders. 
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Final coding schema 
A final coding schema was developed for each of the cases, which captured (i.) cartel structure 
(bilateral versus multilateral), (ii.) cartel demographics (markets affected, participants in the 
cartel, duration of cartel, fine levied, and agreements between the parties), and (iii.) cartel 
organization (face-to-face meetings held, written agreements/memos, emails, telephone 
conversations, and notes). As a key distinction to be drawn was the structure of the cartel, the 
classification of cartel structure was based on establishing the connections between the firms 
involved in each cartel. A cartel was defined as a bilateral cartel if cartel members 
communicated with each other only on a one-to-one basis. In addition, we identified that there 
may exist stronger forms of ‘bilateralism’ whereby cartel members lack awareness of activities 
and agreement between other cartel members (i.e. incomplete contact between all parties). In 
contrast, we defined multilateral cartels as cartels which use multilateral cartel meetings to 
collectively plan, manage, or control cartel activities (i.e. complete contact between all parties). 
In addition, we identified that stronger forms of ‘multilateralism’ exist whereby cartels establish 
formal processes for joint record keeping and adopt joint bureaucratic structures to facility cartel 
management. 
In the following findings section we illustrate (with the exception of one case) the network 
structure of each cartel. These cartel ‘maps’ are illustrated based on the detailed evidence by the 
EU investigations of each cartel. A line connecting companies indicates meetings were held 
between parties and price-fixing agreements were made. The absence of a line denotes that these 
companies had no contact between parties that the EU investigation could identify. These 
contacts were frequently supported by email and telephone contact, although we find greater 
evidence of contact as well as other evidence (such as minutes of meetings, memos, notes) for 
multilateral cartels than for bilaterally organized cartels. 
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Case Studies: Illicit Co-opetition in Four Industries 
In this section we examine the four major price-fixing networks. We initially report two price-
fixing networks that operated multilaterally (Glass, Choline Chloride), followed by a price-fixing 
networks that operated along bilateral lines (Butadiene Rubber). The final cartel (Vitamins) has 
a unique feature of being transformed from multilateral to a bilateral cartel structure. The basic 
characteristics of these cases are presented in Table I. By presenting the bilateral cases first this 
provides a contrast between the more highly secretive networks followed by the more visible and 
detectable multilateral cases. In addition, the cases expose differences in cartel structure, trust 
versus monitoring and control, and managerial and criminal social ordering, that we consider in 
greater depth in the discussion section, along with subsequent ramifications these differences 
have on our current understanding of business-to-business network thinking.  
 
------------------------ 
Table I about here 
------------------------ 
 
Multilateral Collusive Co-opetition 
Flat Glass 
The 2003-2005 Flat Glass cartel provides a good starting point to investigate the managerial 
organization of multilateral collusive arrangements. In particular, this case reveals how 
multilateral cartel structures can allow for an effective means to control prices based on 
bureaucratic managerial principles. Yet, due to this efficiency, suspicious price patterns were 
generated that were detectable by customers and authorities. Furthermore, the presence of 
managerial artefacts, such as memos and receipts, in addition to electronic footprints, provided 
authorities with the required incriminating evidence to prosecute this cartel.  
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Flat glass manufacturing (chiefly used by the construction industry) is highly capital 
intensive, and the industry has a history of commercial relationships including cross-supply 
agreements and joint ventures between manufacturers. The four organizations participating in the 
cartel from Japan (Asahi), the U.S. (Guardian), the UK (Pilkington), and France (Saint-Gobain), 
claimed to be responding to steadily declining prices in the European market for glass, a market 
estimated to be worth 8000 million Euros per annum at the time of the cartel. 
In this case, the European Commission undertook a series of major unannounced 
inspections of Pilkington’s pan-European premises (including its offices in the UK, France, 
Germany and Sweden), Saint-Gobain (at its offices in France and Sweden), as well as Guardian’s 
European premises in Germany and Luxemburg– prompted by complaints by customers of 
parallel price increases – and found evidence of agreements to create and maintain a price-fixing 
cartel. In was hence the objective of homogeneous price and synchronized price increases, which 
led to the detection of this cartel. The documentary evidence obtained painted a picture of a 
highly co-ordinated Pan-European cartel controlled through a series of multilateral meetings 
(with a small number of bilateral meetings) held in hotels and restaurants across Europe as well 
as on the fringes of meetings of the European association for flat glass manufacturers (the 
‘GEPVP’), whose HQ in Brussels was also subject to an unannounced inspection. 
Referred to as “Marketing meeting[s]” in the handwritten notes of a Pilkington 
representative, the manufacturers held seven multilateral meetings across Europe in Paris, 
Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg. The notes obtained from the meetings depict a highly 
organized and concerted effort to “fix the status quo” on competition across Europe and ensure 
that “prices should be kept absolutely stable.” The group meetings were convened, according to 
copies of emails found between the participants, to “get to know [names removed] better and 
exploit areas of mutual interest”, to “see how it [the cartel] was done in the past” under different 
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agreements by predecessors, and to ensure succession between managers participating in the 
cartel on behalf of their firms. These meetings were convened in order to: 
i. Implement collective price increases and price freezes, and agree non-compete 
clauses; 
ii. Decide on their timing; and 
iii. Determine which company would lead with price increases for specific countries 
and customers. 
It was agreed that Germany was generally the lead market for price increases, and, if 
successful, would be extended to other markets beginning with Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, France, and Italy (normally in that sequence), and then extended to other countries 
across Europe without any regular sequence. These price increases were announced by letter to 
customers. Handwritten notes from group meetings highlight the instructions agreed between the 
participants at the meetings: “Price increase agreed. No aggression ... No attack ... .” From the 
onset of the cartel, however, efforts to control the market for glass in Europe were fraught with 
difficulties owing to price disparities between markets and customers requirements, as 
manufacturers’ emails and notes from the meetings attest: 
 
“Price increase next steps...Agreement of 1st level of customers! Payment TERMS is a 
mega challenge. Agreed we go ahead!” 
 
“A Saga becomes Reality”; and 
 
“The free market is more hard-fought!” 
 
 
Despite the manufacturers emphasising among themselves that the “secrecy of the meetings 
needed to be preserved”, documentary evidence was seized in corporate raids of the participants’ 
offices, including copies of internal and external email exchanges, written-up minutes of cartel 
meetings, travel expenses to cartel meetings, as well as handwritten notes and personal notebook 
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entries made by participants at the meetings. In summing up the cartel, The Commission 
described highly organized practices between the manufacturers, with “…notes [that] are 
detailed, structured (sometimes with tables, bullets or numbered items) with a relatively high 
level of precision.” 
The manufacturers were collectively fined EUR 486.9 million3 for their participation in the 
cartel. Based on the documentary evidence obtained the network structure of the flat glass cartel 
is illustrated in Figure I (see below). 
 
----------------------- 
Figure I about here 
----------------------- 
 
Choline Chloride 
The multilateral network structure of the 1992-1994 Choline Chloride4 cartel reveals additional 
in-depth characteristics of multilateral cartels. In particular, this case provides reveals additional 
evidence regarding the ways in which the training and the experience of professional marketing 
managers can undermine the survival of cartel conspiracies. This concerned common managerial 
systems that were used to maintain sales discipline, establish clearly defined processes, and to 
monitor and control distributors. All of this led to a wide-spread reliance on documentation (such 
as note-taking), which was used as evidence against the cartel participants. In addition, it was the 
mutual mistrust of other cartel participants that led to the need to monitor other participants. It 
was routine managerial structures and the ways in which corporations are commonly inclined 
manage business relationships that ultimately led to the detection and unraveling of the cartel. 
                                                          
3The fines for the Flat Glass cartel were as follows: Asahi (Euro 65 million), Guardian (Euro 148 million), 
Pilkington (Euro 140 million), and Saint-Gobain (Euro 133.9 million). 
4 Choline Chloride is chiefly used in the animal feed industry as a feed additive, as well as for the preparation of 
vitamins, infant formulae and nutrient supplements. 
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Accordingly, we can identify institutionalized knowledge structures of marketing managers, 
related corporate routines and beliefs, as well as mistrust between actors as underlying causes of 
multilateral cartel failures. 
The cartel operated between six firms from the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, US, and 
Canada at two closely related levels (European and Global) for two years. The global cartel 
lasted between 1992 and 1994, with the objective of “setting and increasing...worldwide 
price...the allocation of worldwide markets [and] the control of distributors” “by establishing 
exclusive corporate ties over them”, in the face of previously stiff price competition and over-
supply in the market. A major facet of the cartel agreement was that the North American 
producers (Bioproducts, Chinook and DuCoa) should withdraw from competing, in Europe, 
while the European manufacturers (BASF, Akzo Nobel and UCB) should refrain from 
competing in the North American markets, at a time when there was considerable antagonism 
and tension between manufacturers from both continents: 
“They [North American producers] expressed their disappointment that [BASF in 
particular was] planning to ship material to the US; that it would be very disruptive to the 
market [and] could lead to retaliatory action from either BioProducts or Chinook against 
[DuCoa] and BASF and possibly even stepping up shipments to Europe.” 
 
 
The first meeting between all firms took place in Mexico City in 1992, and, together with 
subsequent meetings, constituted a “clear anti-competitive agreement”, where the cartel was 
carefully designed to improve the profitability of the industry and “to bring discipline to the 
worldwide pricing of Choline chloride.” As notes from the meetings attest, the purpose of the 
meetings was to establish “[the] general rules...that all producers should follow” as part of the 
cartel and to attempt to “to work out a mutually beneficial plan.” Although the Mexico meeting 
between the European manufacturers and their North American counterparts served essentially 
as a ‘summit’ meeting, it failed to reach a common agreement to the group’s aim of market 
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stabilization, were parties did not have “...any resolution to anyone’s satisfaction”, but “agreed 
to look at alternatives to try to work out a mutually beneficial plan to keep this from happening.” 
The ill feeling between manufacturers, however, abated as the perceived mutual benefits 
of ‘sharing’ the European and North American markets were made explicit. Although no 
agreement was reached, the Mexico summit meeting provided competitors the opportunity to 
discuss worldwide prices and market shares, market withdrawal, price-fixing, and a feasible 
timescale in which to deploy any agreements (restricted by each company’s commitments to 
their distributors). As one participant from DuCoa observed: 
 
“[A]t that meeting we discussed, among other things, firming up prices. We discussed 
what everybody’s market share was in each region of the world. We discussed North 
American producers not shipping choline to Europe and European producers not 
shipping to North America.” 
 
The turning point for the global cartel was the next meeting held in Ludwigshafen 
(Germany) in 1992, and the conclusion of the so-called ‘Ludwigshafen agreement’. A set of 
“General Rules” were agreed by the manufacturers; this took the form of a report outlining the 
schedule for withdrawal for each of the manufacturers from specific foreign markets and 
outlined an agreement on the world-wide prices of Choline. This report was recovered by the EU 
investigation. 
A series of follow-up meetings were held approximately “every six months to monitor, 
discuss and correct any problems.” These multilateral meetings, typically attended by all cartel 
members (with very few exceptions), were held in various locations including Atlanta, 
Amsterdam, Toronto, and Bruges (Belgium), and lasted approximately from one day to one week 
in duration, signifying a high level of operational planning and co-ordination. Nine global 
meetings were convened in total, and on only two occasions representatives from three firms 
(Akzo Nobel, UCB, and Chinook) were unable to attend. The joint assembly of organizations at 
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both global and European levels provided the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the 
agreements: 
“...we continued to try to increase prices where we could on a worldwide basis. We 
looked at ways to reduce or balance out shipments to various parts of the world. We had 
these types of discussions...at the end there [would be] an agreement to meet again”, “we 
would talk about prices; we would talk about regions...we would talk about what we knew 
about market size, and we had discussions over who had what by country.” 
 
Tensions and mistrust ensued at the follow-up meetings, particularly towards those 
transgressors “who had not implemented the price increases.” Increasingly, agreements could not 
be reached at the global meetings, and, over time, the ‘boardroom ‘style’ cartel’ meetings 
became increasingly unwieldy and difficult to police, as one communication between two actors 
illustrates: “Aggressive behaviour puts pressure on prices...for everybody.” The last global 
meeting was held in Johor Bahru (Malaysia) in 1994. Chinook hosted the meeting and provided a 
slide show “...comparing the group’s objectives at the time of the Ludwigshafen agreement with 
the current situation. The evaluation was not very positive.” The ensuing disagreement was 
attributed to companies not adhering to the agreements on volumes and prices (particularly the 
European manufacturers); as the representative for DuCoa noted: “...there was just a total 
inability to agree on anything.” Mistrust between actors at the meeting was endemic. At the end 
of the meeting Chinook announced that they would be withdrawing their participation in the 
cartel effective immediately. BASF adopted a similar line, while “The others in attendance at the 
meeting appeared to agree.” The global cartel for Choline Chloride was at an end. 
The failure of the global cartel for Chlorine gave rise to one operated by the European 
manufacturers (BASF, Akzo Nobel and UCB), who decided to continue their multilateral price-
fixing and customer/market sharing agreement at a European level between 1994 and 1998. 
Fifteen multilateral meetings (held every three months approximately) were conducted over the 
life of the cartel in Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany. All participants in the cartel 
attended all meetings with the exception of one occasion where a representative from BASF was 
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unable to attend. The European cartel came to end voluntarily by the participants in 1998 after 
they became aware of the DOJ investigation into the North American producers of Choline 
Chloride for a suspected price-fixing cartel. The European manufacturers were subsequently 
found guilty by the EU regulator of antitrust violations and were collectively fined EURO 66.34 
million5. 
Various cartel ‘artefacts’ were found on dawn raids of corporate offices for both the global 
and European cartels including: minutes of meetings, client and price lists, and reports outlining 
the agreements reached and proposed, and slide presentations illustrating the group’s objectives 
with the current situation. These documents articulate the complex mechanisms of the cartel and 
indicate low levels of trust between actors: comprising a detailed cartel ‘constitution’ outlining 
the agreements reached by the European and North American manufacturers drawn up in report 
format, stipulating the markets that were to be stabilized and the manufacturer who was to 
withdraw from which market, as well as the anticipated benefits that the agreement would 
provide for the participants (the ability to invest in plant modernization and expansion). Based on 
these artefacts, we have illustrated the network structures for the Choline Chloride cartels in 
Figures II and III (see below). 
 
------------------------ 
Figure II about here 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Figure III about here 
------------------------ 
 
Bilateral Collusive Co-opetition 
                                                          
5The European manufacturers were fined the following amounts: Akzo Nobel (20.99 million Euros), BASF (34.97 
million Euros), and UCB (10.38 million Euros). Bioproducts, Chinook and DuCoa were not fined due to their 
cessation of price-fixing activities in 1994. The North American producers were, however, fined by the DOJ in the 
US and by the Federal Court of Canada for price-fixing in the market for Choline Chloride. 
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Butadiene Rubber 
The bilateral Butadiene Rubber6 cartel provides us with an important contrast to the multilateral 
cartel structures investigated in the previous two cases. Based on this contrast, we discovered 
how and why the bilateral cartel structures made it difficult for the EU investigators to detect and 
unravel these cartel operations. Also, for this same reason, it can be exceedingly difficult to find 
in-depth data regarding the inner functioning of bilateral cartels, increasing the research value of 
the case despite its limitations. In addition, this case provides additional evidence regarding the 
importance of mutual trust in horizontal collusion. Indeed, one of the primary motives for the 
observed inter-firm communication was the monitoring of other cartel parties adherence to the 
cartel agreement. Finally, in this case, the authorities eventually investigated the cartel after one 
of its members gave evidence against the cartel (as was case with the Vitamin cartel), again 
signaling the central importance of trust in B2B cartels. 
From its inception, the Butadiene Rubber cartel was structured and operated purely as a 
“series of bilateral contacts.” The cartel involved six manufacturers from Europe and the US and 
existed between 1996 and 2002, and although The Commission held the view that the cartel 
probably existed prior to 1996, no evidence was available to confirm this. The purpose of the 
cartel was to attempt to eliminate competition in Europe in a market worth EUR 550 million 
through agreements to fix-prices, share customers via non-aggression agreements, and exchange 
of commercially sensitive information related to sales – all ultimately to stabilize prices in the 
face of weakening demand. As mentioned above, rather than being detected by regulatory 
authorities, this cartel was exposed when Bayer approached The Commission and informed them 
of their participation in the cartel, thus breaching (and thereby emphasizing the importance) of 
trust, a key foundation for success in successful horizontal collusion. 
                                                          
6 Butadiene rubber is a synthetic rubber used chiefly in the manufacture of tyre production. 
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Marketing Executives of each firm had a central role in the planning and co-ordination of 
cartel practices. These executives met bilaterally to discuss the cartel which operated “on the 
fringes” of co-operative meetings of the European Synthetic Rubber Association (ESRA) 
approximately four times a year. Based on the testimony of some of the participants, discussions 
were held in cities across Europe (including Milan, Düsseldorf, Vienna, Amsterdam, Richmond-
on-Thames, Frankfurt, Brussels, Prague, and Hamburg), usually in social settings over dinner or 
on the way to dinner, in bars, hotel rooms, in telephone conversations, and via email. 
With the exception of some handwritten notes, very little documentary evidence of the 
cartel was detected. Regular bilateral meetings (and very occasional trilateral meetings) were 
held between the manufacturers leading to “the conclusion of bilateral agreements” in order to 
preserve the “status quo” in the market. The Commission noted: 
 
“Bilateral telephone contacts between the competitors...played an important role in 
assuring the efficient running of the cartel [and] were particularly important in assuring 
that cartel agreements were being complied with”; and 
 
“An important element in ... cartel meetings were discussions to assure that cartel 
agreements were complied with.” 
 
This implies that the lack of trust between actors increased the amount of communication 
and mutual monitoring between cartel members. These additional communication linkages make 
the cartel easier to detect and investigate by authorities. Nevertheless, due to the bilateral cartel 
structure, The Commission acknowledged the difficulties it faced in unravelling the cartel: 
 
“Concerning the proof of bilateral contacts … it should be added that although, by their 
very nature, direct corroboration of one party’s allegation could only occur through 
admission by the other party of the same contacts. On that basis it can be concluded that 
the existence of such patterns of communications is sufficiently established.” 
 
The Commission further notes that given the penalties that anti-competitive agreements 
attract: 
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“…it is normal for the activities which those practices and those agreements entail to take 
place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, most frequently in a non-
member country, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum.” 
 
Despite the difficulties faced by the Commission in establishing the precise details of the 
cartel (a number of discrepancies were also noted between the information supplied to the 
Commission in testimony by some of the manufacturers for a number of the finer points of the 
cartel including prices, customers, and plant utilisation figures), sufficient proof was established 
that the manufacturers had colluded to fix prices, and a fine of EURO 519.05 million was 
awarded7. In contrast to the other cartels studied, given the frequent (and often undocumented) 
bilateral agreements formed between the manufacturers an illustrative network structure is not 
possible for the Butadiene Rubber cartel. 
 
Vitamins 
Our in-depth analysis of the Vitamin cartel allowed us to discover and to explain a key tension 
between two central cartel objectives, namely to (i.) establish robust inter-firm managerial 
structures between cartel members to control industry prices, and (ii.) allow cartels to remain 
hidden from all external parties. Based on our observations multilateral cartels are more suited to 
effectively coordinating and monitoring collusive practices, whereas bilateral cartel structure are 
more difficult to detect by outsiders. 
The rationale for co-operation in the Vitamin cartel was in the face of aggressive price 
cutting in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the face of competition from Chinese and Russian 
manufacturers. Against this, the purpose of the cartel was to fix-prices for the worldwide sale of 
vitamins, allocate sales quotas, and implement price increases in a market worth EUR 3.25 
billion. This was achieved through the creation of ‘cartel machinery’ designed to monitor and 
                                                          
7The fines received for each firm were the following: Dow (EUR 64.575 million), Eni (EUR 272.25 million), 
Shell (EUR 160.875 million), Kaucuk (EUR 17.55 million), Trade-Stomil (EUR 3.8 million); Bayer received 
full immunity under the EU corporate leniency programme.  
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enforce adherence to the collusive agreements, and ultimately to stabilize the global vitamins 
market. At the same time that the collusive agreement was being enforced, the cartel participants 
were simultaneously competing on brand strength in markets which were not part of the price-
fixing agreement. 
The Vitamins cartel was particularly complex involving thirteen firms from five countries 
operating eight distinct but overlapping cartels between 1989 and 1999. Across the life of the 
Vitamin cartel it could be seen to operate in two distinct phases; initially this was along 
multilateral lines, but as we shall see, this structure was modified in response to external forces. 
For the first nine years of the existence of the cartel it operated at four levels. Each level 
convened from two to four times per year involving marketing managers at different levels to 
discuss different products and prices: 
i. ‘Top level’ (attended by most senior corporate officers and occasionally heads of 
marketing); 
ii. Heads of marketing (who managed cartel operations); 
iii. Regional product marketing; and 
iv. Global product marketing. 
At each of these four levels of horizontal collusion (often referred to as “summit meetings”) 
senior marketing managers played a central role, coordinating cartel activities. Initially, this 
“complex structure of regular meetings evolved”, as described by the Commission’s report, was 
designed with the specific purpose of facilitating “relationships of trust.” These multilateral face-
to-face meetings took place in hotels, restaurants and public places in a number of European 
cities including Basel, Zurich, Geneva, Paris, and Frankfurt, with each firm taking turns to act as 
host. Meetings during this period were mainly multilateral in nature, although manufacturers 
participated to different degrees in the various cartel agreements. Senior managers were present 
to offer “high-level support [to] define [the] overall strategy” and to ensure each party was 
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committed to “the agreement”, while heads of marketing attended to facilitate the “practical 
operation of the agreement”, and to “monitor the implementation” of the agreements. In addition, 
regional marketing managers met to discuss and implement pricing for individual customers. 
During the first phase of the cartel regional collusive meetings were often combined with 
global meetings. In order to better control and monitor the illegal agreements the cartel was 
likened to operating as a single entity: 
“The cartel’s operation centred on the preparation and implementation of the annual 
budget ... [employing] mechanisms closely modelled on the internal financial 
management and controls of ‘a single undertaking’.” 
 
Despite the desire of actors to reach consensus based on mutual trust, the cartel become 
subject to creeping bureaucracy. During group meetings the mechanisms to monitor and 
control agreements were created: (i.) worldwide sales quotas agreed by all parties at each 
meeting, (ii.) penalties for non-adherence of the agreements and compensation for the injured 
party (an agreement that cartel members who were “ahead” at an annual review meeting to 
purchase the ‘shortfall’ from an order from the ‘losing’ party at the end of the financial year), 
(iii.) creation of artefacts to support the management of the cartel (worksheets and related 
support documents, annual budgets, charts comparing sales figures, yearly/monthly plans, 
and a computerized database to store information), (iv.) and agreements to destroy all 
sensitive documents as soon as the relevant parties had studied them. The dominant 
organization for the agreements was Roche; they “organised, orchestrated and policed” the 
cartel, and along with BASF and Rhone-Poulenc, the three organizations “determine[d] 
overall strategy” and “met frequently to concretise their agreements.” Drawing upon 
documentary evidence we have conceptualized the primary network structure of this cartel in 
Figure IV. 
------------------------ 
Figure IV about here 
------------------------ 
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Thus phase one of the cartel operated along multilateral lines: frequent summit meetings 
attended by managers at all levels who endeavoured to create a single management control and 
financial system. Further, despite efforts to create ‘relationships of trust’, the wealth of artefacts 
created to manage the cartel belied its secrecy. Interestingly, however, in 1997 the Vitamin cartel 
dramatically changed its structure. This was in response to an announcement by the US 
Department of Justice (DoJ) that it was to conduct an investigation of the vitamins industry in the 
US due to allegations of a price-fixing conspiracy operating. As The Commission notes in its 
investigation: 
 
“The participants in the [cartel] meetings had already become aware of the interest of the 
antitrust authorities in their secret arrangements and sought to minimize the number and 
frequency of their contacts. The last trilateral meeting was held in Basel in November 
1997, when it was decided that in future meetings would only occur on a bilateral basis”; 
and 
 
“Even then, [after the DoJ announcement] rather than put an end to the cartel, they took 
the decision to meet less frequently and with greater circumspection ... Thereafter there 
were no multilateral meetings.” 
 
 
For the cartel “complete security” was now paramount as was the necessity “to continue 
the cooperation in a modified form and on a ‘more discreet basis’.” In the attempt to avoid 
drawing attention to the cartel (but not wishing to cease its activities) the multilateral structure 
was duly disbanded with “no further group meetings [taking place] but only one-on-one contacts 
as necessary” and was replaced with a bilateral structure whereby Roche acted as the ‘hub’ and 
line of communication for participants, with only very occasional meetings between Roche, 
BASF and Rhône-Poulenc, often at private residencies. These measures were also extended to 
cartel bureaucracy; personal agreements (and trust between actors) were favoured over the 
creation of artefacts. 
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The newly adopted bilateral mode of co-ordination hence allowed the cartel to continue 
operating in a more discreet manner, although lacking some of the earlier observed means of 
effective mutual co-ordination and communication; contact was reduced to a small number of 
senior managers in each firm (e.g. heads of marketing and commercial directors) (see Figure V). 
 
------------------------ 
Figure V about here 
------------------------ 
 
The existence of the cartel came to light on 12th May 1999, when Rhône-Poulenc informed 
the Commission of its involvement in a cartel as well as other manufacturers involved in the 
cartel through a written summary of activities. In addition, Roche and BASF were charged with 
price-fixing and allocating sales in the US and elsewhere under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
(1890) on 20th May 1999, while Roche, BASF, Rhône-Poulenc, Daiichi and Eisai pleaded guilty 
in the Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division) to indictments charging conspiracy to prevent 
competition in violation of Section 45 of the Competition Act (1985). Five manufacturers 
received leniency in return for their co-operation. The final fine levied by the Commission 
amounted to EUR 855.23 million; commensurate with the strength and centrality of each firm’s 
role in the cartel8. 
 
Discussion: Industrial Organizations and Collusive Network Forms 
In our findings we identified how and why bilateral/multilateral network interaction, mutual 
trust, and managerial predisposition influenced both the success and failure of cartels. Next we 
will engage in more in-depth analysis of these dimensions, and their interdependencies, by 
                                                          
8 The final fines were set at the following levels:  Roche (EUR 462 million), BASF (EUR 296.16 million), 
Aventis (EUR 5.04 million), Takeda (EUR 37.06 million), Solvay (EUR 9.1 million), Merck (EUR 9.24 
million), Daiichi (EUR 23.4 million), and Eisai (EUR 13.23 million). 
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introducing the metaphoric concepts of ‘shadow networks’ and ‘dark networks.’ Shadows 
(depending on the strength and relative position of a light-source to an object) will, to varying 
degrees, represent the image that casts the shadow. In some circumstances it may be utterly 
impossible to identify an object from its shadow; nevertheless, a shadow may still be observed 
however weak or poorly representative of the source object it may be. In contrast, in conditions 
of total darkness (such as a full eclipse, or a room with no windows or light source), will render 
all objects effectively invisible. Similarly, there are dark and shadow qualities found in cartels, 
which influence network interaction and managerial ability to control cartels. 
We will argue that price-fixing cartels are faced with a fundamental trade-off between 
secrecy and managerial efficiency. Accordingly, shadow networks seek to maintain secrecy 
without materially sacrificing managerial efficiency. In contrast secrecy is the most important 
consideration in designing a dark network, which significantly restricts the possible set of 
activities. In addition, these concepts allow us to make tentative theoretical generalizations to 
other types of hidden or secretive arrangements in B2B networks, beyond the immediate context 
of price-fixing cartels. We will begin our analysis by discussing shadow and dark networks 
across three key dimensions: (i.) managerial and criminal social ordering, (ii.) cartel structure 
and (iii.) trust versus monitoring and control (Table II). We conclude the section with a brief 
reflection on the co-opetition literature. 
 
Dimensions of shadow and dark networks 
Managerial and Criminal Social Ordering. In our case studies we discovered that marketing 
managers often struggled to take effective precautions to protect their cartel conspiracies 
from detection. We observed marketing managers maintaining criminal cartel conspiracies 
similarly to how they were organizing and managing their legitimate marketing enterprises 
(as evidenced by the two multilateral cartels operating in the Flat Glass and Choline Chloride 
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industries, and, initially, in the Vitamins cartel) (Table II). In this regard, the marketing 
managers’ education and past experience, and organizations’ standard operating practices 
were a considerable liability. Indeed, marketing managers may not even be entirely aware of 
how their embodied knowledge structures (or habitus) conditions their management of illicit 
network interaction. This is in marked contrast to the more secretive bilateral networks where 
the illegal nature of such endeavours seemed foremost in the minds of managers when 
constituting these network forms (Butadiene Rubber, and, latterly, in the Vitamins cartel) 
(Table II). 
 
----------------------- 
Table II about here 
----------------------- 
 
Accordingly, we can compare the studied ‘shadow-network’ qualities of such 
relatively easily detectable multilaterally structured ‘managerial cartels’ with criminal 
conspiracies, which are genuinely designed to operate as secretive ‘dark networks’, and 
which correspondingly adopt bilateral modes of organization illustrated in Figure VI (see 
below). 
 
----------------------- 
Figure VI about here 
----------------------- 
 
This comparison reveals the inadequacies of the managerial modus operandi. We read 
and hear about these ‘dark networks’ almost on a daily basis due to their ubiquity in the 
media, but do not readily see their link to industrial marketing management or other business 
practices. For example, although terrorist acts by Al Qaeda are regularly reported in the 
media, we do not currently have a particularly definitive understanding of their organization. 
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Although there is some form of centralization in terms of leadership, attacks perpetrated by 
Al Qaeda are undertaken in a highly decentralized way by operating units that have 
considerable autonomy and often act bilaterally to conceal the identities of members (Raab 
and Milward, 2003). We are familiar with these structures in other terrorist organizations as 
well in the illegal trade of drugs such as in heroin and arms trafficking. These networks 
typically have bilateral structures which render the network relatively opaque and 
subsequently difficult to detect and unravel, as Brzezinski (2002: 26) observes: 
 
“…the narcotics industry has adapted what might be called the Osama bin Laden 
approach to management: base your operation in remote safe havens, the more war-
torn and chaotic the better; stay small and shifty, use specialized subcontractors or 
freelancers on a need-to-know basis; vary your routes and routines whenever 
possible; and most important, always insulate yourself with plenty of expendable 
intermediaries in case someone gets caught and talks.” 
 
Griffith (1997) makes similar observations in Caribbean drug smuggling gangs, which have 
little vertical integration or hierarchical forms of control so as to evade detection and operate 
through kinship links and friendship networks (Figure VI). The same network structures are 
evident in the market for heroin exported from Southeast Asia and South America to countries in 
North America and Europe. These networks, “…must be covert, and consolidation and vertical 
integration are extremely risky because one broken link can destroy a tightly coupled network as 
police roll up the network by moving from one link to the next” (Raab and Milward, 2003: 421). 
Hence we are left with a picture of highly concealed networks where decisions and channels of 
communication are bilateral, power is dispersed among actors, networks are decentralized and 
heterogeneous, and actors are loosely coupled; indeed, bilateral structures which are in marked 
contrast to the multilateral and highly centralized industrial collusion for price-fixing described 
in the cartel literature. 
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Based on this understanding, it is appropriate to pose critical questions regarding the 
current academic understanding of industrial cartels, which reflects the managerial ethos (cf. 
Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Baker and Faulkner, 1993). The cartel literature tends to focus on 
bureaucratic forms of hierarchical control and multilateral structures, even when the need for 
secrecy in collusive practices is acknowledged (for example, Baker and Faulkner, 1993). In 
addition, we maintain that managerial training and experience will condition marketing managers 
to operate managerially, even when running criminal cartels. In such ‘managerial cartels’, 
bureaucratic structures are created to more effectively manage horizontal collusion between 
competitors. In describing cartels as an extension of organizational bureaucracy, however, there 
is a danger of not recognizing that successful criminal conspiracies tend to be structured 
differently from ordinary corporations. Based on the above discussion, we can now formulate the 
following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: Managerial training and experience predisposes marketing managers to 
establish cartels that are governed as shadow networks, and not as dark networks. 
 
Structure. A key difference between the cartels examined lay principally in their choice of 
collusive network structure and governance, and these network structures differ markedly. Based 
on our case study findings, we can tentatively assert that the two ‘forms’ or ‘types’ of cartel 
interaction - multilateral versus bilateral - may have a significant influence upon cartel detection, 
conviction and unraveling. In making these observations we defined multilateral cartels as 
cartels which use multilateral cartel meetings to collectively plan, manage, or control cartel 
activities (Table II). In contrast, a cartel was defined as a bilateral cartel if cartel members 
communicated with each other only on a one-to-one basis. (Figure VI). We propose that it is 
more difficult to detect and prosecute bilateral cartels in comparison to multilateral cartels. For 
example, as we discovered, the Vitamin cartel switched their operations to a bilateral structure to 
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avoid detection by the authorities9. This argument is also in part supported by Levenstein and 
Suslow (2006), who found a negative relationship between the number of cartel members and its 
duration. For example, a reduction in the number of cartel members tends to also reduce 
complexity in inter-organizational communication and co-ordination, with an extreme form of 
such simplicity being a bilateral cartel network, comprised of only two organizations. 
In addition, due to the complexity of inter-organizational interaction, the observed 
multilateral cartels (Flat Glass and Choline Chloride) created large amounts of artefacts, such as 
paperwork and documentation outlining the ‘rules’ or ‘constitution’ of the cartel (Table II). In 
contrast, the bilateral cartels studied (Vitamins and Butadiene Rubber) were designed to be 
secretive, thus rendering these cartels relatively opaque, enduring, and more difficult to detect 
and unravel. In both these cases the investigating authority (The Commission) raises doubts as to 
specific dates and meetings, and, at times, even the actors involved – an investigatory caveat not 
found in the investigations of the Flat Glass and Choline Chloride cartels. Here it needs to be 
noted that not all detected cartels lead to convictions. In addition, even if managers running and 
operating a cartel are convicted, this does not necessarily lead to the unraveling of a cartel. 
Given the foregoing we can assert the following: 
 
Proposition 2a: When the primary motivation of cartel members is secrecy, cartels are more 
likely to be structured bilaterally than multilaterally.  
 
Proposition 2b: Bilaterally structured cartels have a longer life-span than 
multilaterally structured cartels. 
 
Trust vs Monitoring and Control. The contemporary cartel literature has largely adopted the 
position that successful cartels need to establish mutual mechanisms of monitoring and 
control (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006); this is employed to ensure that all cartel members 
                                                          
9 Interestingly, however, we did not see the reverse. That is, a bilateral cartel switching to a multilateral 
structure. 
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adhere to the agreed prices and/or output levels (as there may be financial incentives to 
secretly break cartel rules). In addition, it has been argued that successful cartels have the 
means to enforce price discipline among its members “through self-imposed carrots and 
sticks” (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006: 86). Problematically, our findings contradict both of 
these assumptions. What we found in our case studies is that mutual mechanisms of 
monitoring and control tend to make cartels more vulnerable to detection, by generating 
additional communication linkages, paper trails, and electronic footprints (Figure VI). For 
example, the Commission’s case against the Flat Glass cartel was based on documentary 
evidence, including internal and external email exchanges, written-up minutes of meetings, 
travel expenses, and personal notebook entries (Table II). Further, based on our findings we 
propose that elaborate mechanisms of monitoring and control will tend to make cartels more 
multilateral in their network interaction (due to the greater need for joint evaluation and 
decision-making, and in order to have a simple means of distributing information to all 
parties). This we have again argued to increase cartels’ detection and unraveling rates. 
Conversely, bilateral network interaction would seem less conducive to comprehensive 
monitoring and control arrangements, whereby trust becomes an even more important 
consideration. It should be noted, however, the complex role that mistrust may play in both 
multilateral and bilateral networks; paradoxically, while mistrust may encourage actors to 
create extensive bureaucratic mechanisms of monitoring and control in multilateral networks, 
in the case of bilateral networks mistrust may result in actors’ unwillingness to create 
excessively formalized means of control. This is because formal means of control present a 
risk factor, which can potentially be used as evidence against the cartel participants by 
authorities, such as paper trails being discovered by authorities 
The findings above provide an interesting comparison to the related topic of the role 
of trust in international joint ventures. For example, Groot and Merchant (2000: 580) observe 
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that “a lack of trust between partners sometimes leads to more complex and, hence, 
destructively slow decision-making processes.” This has clear parallels with the Choline 
Chloride case, where trust appeared to be limited and actors could not agree on tenets of the 
cartel; this resulted in increasing levels of bureaucracy and complexity to their multilateral 
meetings, and ultimately to the collapse of the cartel. Consequently, mutual trust has a 
heightened importance in B2B cartels, due to the criminal nature of activities and the need to 
conceal their activities to outsiders. Clearly cartel agreements cannot be enforced by law, 
effectively reducing the scope of ‘carrots and sticks’ available to enforce cartel agreements. 
A further related issue is what Tomkins (2001: 167) refers to as a “trade-off between 
trust and control mechanisms”; in the context of alliances between organizations he argues 
that trust is a key component of information exchange and processing in relationships, but not 
a simple one. Although early general definitions of trust have been provided in the literature 
(e.g. Luhmann, 1979), Tomkins provides a more detailed definition of trust between alliance 
partners, and one that also has an interesting relevancy to the current context: 
 
“The adoption of a belief by one party in a relationship that the other party will not act 
against his or her interests, where this belief is held without undue doubt or suspicion and 
in the absence of detailed information about the actions of that other party” (Tomkins, 
2001: 165). 
 
In the case of the four cartels studied it can with no certainty be assumed that any one 
party would not act selfishly or against the interests of another party in the cartel (i.e. basic 
game theory, or prisoner’s dilemma), particularly (or especially) when there is a high degree 
of transparency due to documentary evidence. This is directly at odds with some scholars 
who posit an inverse relationship between detailed information and trust (Wicks et al. 1999). 
Tomkins, however, offers an alternative: 
 
“…firms that are highly economically interdependent could strive to avoid collapse either 
by building higher levels of trust or by building more extensive control mechanisms with 
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the associated increase in information” (2001: 167, emphasis in original). 
 
In this sense trust can be a calculative phenomenon, just as it is to a greater extent in 
price-fixing cartels given their illegal nature. In our cases the need to build trust was 
paramount – information (particularly physical artefacts) consistently undermined cartel 
secrecy. Hence trust acts as an alternative to information exchange and is a preferable mode 
of control in bilateral B2B cartels. 
Consequently, the potential lack of mutual trust between cartel participants represents 
a fundamental problem to cartel management, which cannot be entirely rectified by mutual 
mechanisms of monitoring and control (Figure VI). For example, it is common for cartels to 
become exposed by one of the cartel participants informing the authorities of the cartels’ 
existence (in exchange for leniency), just as the Butadiene Rubber cartel was exposed by 
Bayer – a key protagonist in the cartel. Paradoxically, establishing mutual mechanisms of 
monitoring and control may indicate (and incite) a lack of trust between cartel members, 
which we propose to be a fatal flaw of cartel management. 
 
Proposition 3a:  When there is a strong managerial motivation to monitor and control other 
cartel members, cartels are more likely to be structured multilaterally than bilaterally. 
 
Proposition 3b: When cartel members have low levels of mutual trust, they are more 
likely to manage cartels as shadow networks than as dark networks.  
 
Proposition 3c: Cartels which operate based on trust-relationship have a longer life-
span, in comparison to cartels which lack trust and require mutual monitoring and 
controlling by cartel participants. 
 
Proposition 3d: Cartels that are managed as dark networks have longer life-span in 
comparison to cartels that are managed as shadow networks. 
 
 
 
Reflections on the co-opetition literature 
In addition to shedding light on collusive network forms, our findings provide implications for 
the literature on illegal forms of co-opetition. It is hoped that this explication will also broaden 
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the nascent literature and debate on the topic and expand this line of enquiry in business-to-
business research. We noted a number of shortcomings within the co-opetition literature that we 
now briefly expand on. 
Initially, we extend the traditional thinking on co-opetition, by recognizing that in contrast 
to accepted thinking (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; 1996), co-opetition practices may not always 
advance competition but actually stifle it in the form of price-fixing practices that may lack 
visibility to the marketplace. Further, we note that the ‘what’ factors that influence illegal co-
opetition include the threat of new market entrants, and a decline in price and margins – external 
forces that in other circumstances may actually encourage partners to collaborate with 
competitors in legal projects (Rusko, 2011). In addition, given that almost 500 cartels have been 
detected since 1990, involving thousands of companies, such forms of co-opetition are far from 
isolated and merit inclusion as a type of (albeit illegal) co-opetition (cf. Walley, 2007; Rusko, 
2011). 
Next, we note that the ‘where’ of co-opetition did in our cases occur in upstream markets –
confirming previous research on co-opetition (e.g. Walley, 2007; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000) – 
suggesting that future research examining illegal forms of co-opetition in downstream (output) 
markets would merit study. We can, however, extend the ‘where’ of co-opetition further by 
noting that illegal forms of co-opetition – due to the need to remain secret – physically take place 
away from corporate offices including in hotels, restaurants, and on the fringes of industry trade 
fairs and associations. Finally, in terms of the ‘how’ of co-opetition (i.e. the structure of illegal 
forms of co-opetition), the findings in the preceding section point to two network structures 
designed to maintain secrecy (‘dark’ and ‘shadow’ networks). 
Collectively, these findings suggest the merit in broadening the scope of co-opetition 
analyses to encompass both legal and even illegal forms of co-opetition or else risk artificially 
narrowing the scope of co-opetition research and rendering it incomplete. 
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Conclusion and Implications 
Historically, collusive relationships between competitors have remained largely invisible to 
industrial marketing investigations and researchers. This is in-part due to the criminal nature of 
price-fixing cartels whereby managers have had a strong incentive to hide these illicit 
arrangements from the marketplace, regulators and academic investigators. In this research, 
however, archival research methods enabled an in-depth analysis of B2B interaction of past 
cartel conspiracies. Accordingly, this research seeks to take tentative steps towards establishing 
price-fixing cartels as a significant new line of enquiry of in the field of industrial marketing. In 
so doing, we have advanced knowledge by examining a form of co-opetition that helps us to 
understand horizontal collusive relationships in more detail, which complements (and extends) 
our detailed understanding of vertical relationships in industrial marketing. In our investigation, 
we have considered questions related to the ‘what’ (factors influencing collusion amongst 
competitors), ‘how’ (different ways of maintaining collusive relationships), and ‘why’ (motives 
for establishing particular forms of collusive relationships) of these largely ignored forms of co-
opetition (cf. Rusko, 2011; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). 
Our investigation uncovered two broad types of collusive practices, which we described by 
the umbrella terms ‘shadow’ and ‘dark’ networks. Both shadow and dark networks concern 
secretive forms of network interaction, largely invisible to outsiders. However, the former are 
designed to function with considerable managerial efficiency, whereby some compromises are 
made to aid secrecy. In contrast, dark networks are designed for total secrecy, which result in 
less manageable interaction between firms. Overall, the ordering rationale of shadow networks 
was more related to typical managerial projects, whereas dark networks had characteristics akin 
to criminal/terrorist organizations. Network interaction of shadow networks was to a large extent 
multilateral, such as the use of multi-party cartel meetings to plan, organize and control cartels. 
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In contrast, dark networks relied exclusively upon bilateral network interaction to ensure a higher 
level of secrecy. In addition, shadow networks use bureaucratic means of ordering, which are not 
a characteristic of dark networks. Finally, shadow networks seek to establish mechanisms to 
monitor the activities of their members to ensure adherence to cartel agreements. In contrast, 
dark networks need to rely upon mutual trust in the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Managerial implications 
The framing of practical implications in a paper of this nature (in part, a critical marketing 
perspective) is challenging, given that we hesitate in providing an exposition of ‘improved’ cartel 
management. We can, however, suggest practical measures for cartel avoidance and why 
marketing managers may find themselves party to collusive agreements of this kind. 
Our findings reveal new type of risks to marketing managers, which should be seen as a 
warning against participation in illegal price-fixing cartels. Our evidence suggests that the 
experience and training of marketing managers is more conducive to establishing and running 
cartels as “shadow networks”. This is because “shadow network” share many of the 
characteristics of ‘ordinary’ types of other inter-organizational relationships, in comparison to 
more secretive “dark networks”.  Also, “shadow networks” can better achieve the managerial 
objective of efficient cartel organizations, including systematic monitoring and control of other 
cartel participants. Yet, “shadow networks” are vulnerable to being detected by customers and 
authorities, which can result in criminal convictions against marketing managers. These findings 
cast doubt on many earlier studies and assumptions concerning collusive B2B interaction (e.g. 
Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Baker and Faulkner, 1993). It has previously been assumed that 
successful cartels have “self-imposed carrots and sticks” (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006: 86) to 
maintain cartel discipline. This characterization is, in part, consistent with our description of 
shadow networks. Problematically, we have argued that the lack of secrecy in shadow networks 
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critically reduces their long-term survival, particularly as managers in highly bureaucratic 
organizations (or highly mistrusting networks) may find themselves in cartels that leave 
considerable paper trails. This heightened need to monitor and control implies a low level of trust 
between cartel members, which can be seen as fatal flaw in any criminal conspiracy. In highly 
scrutinized regulatory environments it is hence not entirely wrong to characterize shadow 
networks as born to fail arrangements. Consequently, the extant cartel literature has inadvertently 
propagated assumptions about cartels which are more likely to be detected by regulators. In 
contrast, by sacrificing managerial efficiency, dark networks are more likely to remain hidden 
over long periods of time. Organizations can, however, deploy measures to ensure that neither 
type of price-fixing networks are created in practice, as we will now consider. 
Marketing managers may (as part of a collusive network) be pulled unwillingly into a cartel 
by the relationships they hold. For example, our findings also revealed how the boundary 
spanning role of marketing managers between different organizations made them vulnerable to 
illicit collusive practices (Wilkie and Moore, 1999: 200). For example, it has been recognized 
that this position provides marketing managers with “ample opportunity to engage in guideline-
relevant offences such as price fixing, bribery, fraud and discrimination” (LeClair et al. 1997: 
29). Indeed, if a marketer is uninformed they may unwittingly and unknowingly fall foul of such 
laws. In addition to not being cognisant of antitrust laws, some marketers may even eschew 
policy matters on the premise that this is an issue for lawyers and as legal considerations may not 
be an important aspect of marketing planning and strategy (LeClair, 2000); yet antitrust agencies 
are pursuing individuals as well as companies. As a result, marketers and their organizations 
need to be cognisant of policy issues, such as antitrust laws, in a number of jurisdictions when 
framing their marketing objectives (Yoffie and Kwak, 2001; Ashton and Pressey, 2008). Given 
this thinking, an awareness of government policies and laws in areas such as antitrust needs to be 
seen as a key business task. When operating in international markets the potential for 
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undertaking anticompetitive actions is likely to be higher due to the greater scope of such laws 
and variation in antitrust laws between countries. Consequently, marketing objectives should 
take into consideration the rules for competitive behaviour (LeClair, 2000: 207) to both reduce 
risks for individuals and risks within the marketing planning process. As marketers may be 
central protagonists to anticompetitive practices – which the four cases studies of collusive 
cartels studied demonstrate – such practices should be thoroughly understood by both marketing 
managers and their organizations. 
Cartels are being investigated and discovered at a faster rate than has ever previously been 
the case, with anti-cartel enforcement now constituting the main priority of antitrust agencies 
such as the DOJ (Connor, 2008: 4-6). It is estimated that a major company admits an antitrust 
violation every ten days, and that most organizations’ antitrust programmes are thought not fit 
for purpose (Hobbs, 2004). It is, therefore, essential – even in a period of corporate cost-cutting – 
that attention to corporate antitrust programmes does not diminish; failure to do so is to risk 
exposing the organization to potentially costly antitrust breaches. More specifically, given that 
“[m]arketing and antitrust are strongly interrelated” (Shocker, 2007: 95), and a potential cause of 
corporate antitrust breaches – as the findings to the present study attest – self-regulation would 
seem particularly relevant to the marketing function. 
Previous studies have outlined guidance on self-auditing business-to-business interactions 
and relationships (see, for example, Fontenot and Hyman, 2004 and Yoffie and Kwak, 2001). In 
addition to training marketing and sales personnel (through professional education as well as a 
feature of degree programmes at universities and colleges), other (less conventional) measures 
could include: disclosure of meetings with competitors by all personnel (or else to discourage 
such meetings unless part of a legitimate form of co-operation - such as a joint venture); limit 
membership of trade associations and monitor events; periodic email audits (and also travel 
expenses); monitoring price trends and changes; and ensure that all price-setting decisions are 
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scrutinized by cross-organizational groups. Such measures may well assist in the detection of 
shadow networks with their generally large paper-trails and often transparent multilateral 
network structure; in the case of detecting dark networks, however, regulators may have to rely 
more extensively on whistleblowers and vigilant customers. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
No study is without its limitations and this study is no exception. As this study concerns criminal 
conspiracies, it is important to acknowledge the inherent difficulties in forming a complete 
picture of secretive events; as a result some relevant information may have remained hidden 
from our investigation. Having said this, we have reason to believe that many of the companies 
in question have fully collaborated with authorities providing relatively comprehensive accounts 
of the relevant cartel activities. Second, while our initial screening process included a large 
number of companies, no statistical generalizations can be drawn from our cases. This said we 
must temper our propositions in light of future studies which may draw different (and possibly 
contrasting) conclusions. We would thus welcome studies that test our propositions with larger 
(and more generalizable) samples, even if they provide counter-arguments. What our results do 
suggest is that when one examines industrial cartels in any depth then our current thinking of 
them may be transformed. 
Our exposition of dark and shadow networks – and the involvement of marketers in such 
acts – suggests it is worthwhile to track investigations undertaken by the EU regulator (and 
others) in order to ascertain the future involvement of marketers and, as we outlined in the 
introduction, so that marketing scholarship can attain a greater comprehension all aspects of our 
discipline (Shocker, 2007; Tadajewski, 2010). 
Future studies of collusive industrial networks may be weakened by employing the 
traditional analytical frameworks and tools we have at our disposal in business and 
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organizational research. This calls for studies that look beyond current management theories and 
taxonomies. Studying deviant networks (such as for terrorism, arms trafficking, or heroin 
distribution) may afford us a better understanding of successful deviant industrial networks. This 
need to rethink the measures adopted to examine cartels should be important as current views 
offer a rather jaundiced account of cartel structures and practices. As collusive industry networks 
are perduring and more common than was first thought, there is a need for marketers to 
understand them better. Complementing this would be studies that attempt to better understand 
the ‘dark side’ of industrial networks and organizations, where ‘secret societies’ (such as 
networks that engage in industrial espionage, price-fixing, bribery, employee fraud, and so forth) 
are rarely acknowledged currently. This would seem intuitively important to marketing 
discourse, particularly if the boundary-spanning nature of marketing management work finds 
them draws into certain illegal acts. 
Finally, arguably a weakness of the literature examining co-opetition is its narrow 
definition and rejection of some forms of co-opetition (cf. Rusko, 2011). Failure to recognize all 
forms of co-opetition (and the motives driving actors to make strategic choices concerning both 
legitimate and illegitimate forms of co-operation) would be to render industrial marketing 
scholarship the poorer and incomplete. 
 
“The fact that secrets do not remain guarded forever is the weakness of the secret society” 
(Georg Simmel, 1950). 
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TABLE I 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR PRICE-FIXING CARTELS 
Market Vitamins Butadiene 
Rubber 
Choline Chloride Flat glass 
Concluding year 
of investigation 
2001 2006 2004 2007 
Structure Bilateral Bilateral Multilateral Multilateral 
Number of 
participants in 
the cartel 
Thirteen Six Six Four 
Nationality of 
parent 
Switzerland, 
Germany, 
France, the 
Netherlands, 
Japan 
 
Germany, U.S., 
Italy, the 
Netherlands, Czech 
Republic, Poland 
 
the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium, 
U.S., Canada 
 
Japan, U.S., UK, 
France 
Duration of 
cartel 
Ten years 
(1989-99) 
Six years 
(1996-2002) 
Six years 
(1992-98) 
Two years 
(2003-2005) 
Markets affected Global European 
Economic Area 
Global European 
Economic Area 
Fine EUR 855.22 
million 
EUR 519 million EUR 66.3 million EUR 486.9 million 
 
 
 
 
Figure I 
Multilateral Network Structure for the Flat Glass Cartel 
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Figure II 
Multilateral Network Structure for the Global Choline Chloride Cartel (1992-1994) 
 
 
 
                          
 
Figure III 
Multilateral Network Structure for the European Choline Chloride Cartel (1994-1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV 
Multilateral Network Structure for the Vitamins Cartel (1989-1997) 
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Figure V 
Bilateral Network Structure for the Vitamins Cartel (1997-1999) 
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TABLE II 
The Characteristics of Two Forms of Collusive Business Practices 
   
 Shadow Networks Dark Networks 
 Choline Chloride (2004); Flat 
glass (2007) 
Vitamins (2001); Butadiene 
Rubber (2006) 
Social Ordering Extension of normal 
business/managerial practices; 
highly centralized; tight coupling. 
Operation of secretive network; 
decentralized; loose coupling. 
Structure Collective group ‘board’ meetings; 
bureaucratic record keeping; 
numerous artefacts. 
Meetings between only two parties at 
a time, and as necessary; limited 
record keeping and artefacts. 
Trust vs. 
Monitoring and 
Control 
Limited trust – control through 
group agreement and recourse to 
records and artefacts. 
Attempts to control operations 
through mutual trust. 
 SHADOW NETWORKS 
 
- Designed to allow high levels 
of managerial efficiency, at 
the expense of secrecy 
 
- Multilateral network 
communications* 
 
- Bureaucratic and formal 
means of monitor and 
control to overcome limited 
trust 
 
- Managerial culture and 
operating practices, such as 
extensive note taking,  and 
detectable electronic  
footprints 
 
DARK NETWORKS 
 
- Designed for maximal 
secrecy at the expense of 
managerial efficiency 
 
- Bilateral network 
communications** 
 
- Close relationships of trust, 
such as kinship and 
friendship networks 
 
 
- Culture of secret/criminal 
societies, such as 
cryptographic messages 
and absence of ordinary 
electronic footprint 
 
Continuum of 
properties 
 
 
 
*“Multilateral network communications” refers specifically to the use of joint (cartel) meetings to collectively plan, 
manage, or control (cartel) network activities (i.e. complete contact between all parties). In addition, we identified that 
stronger forms of ‘multilateralism’ exist whereby a (cartels) network establishes formal processes for joint record 
keeping and adopt joint bureaucratic structures to facilitate (cartel) network management. In this situation a network 
assumes some characteristics of an organizational hierarchy. 
**“Bilateral network communications” refers network parties communicating with each other only on a one-to-one 
basis. In addition, we identified that there may exist stronger forms of ‘bilateralism’ whereby (cartel) network members 
lack awareness of activities and agreement between other cartel members (i.e. incomplete contact between all parties). 
 
 
Figure VI 
Shadow vs. Dark Collusive Business Networks 
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